{"id":5814,"date":"2026-10-07T13:12:07","date_gmt":"2026-10-07T13:12:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sharefoundation.info\/?p=5814"},"modified":"2026-10-14T13:42:51","modified_gmt":"2026-10-14T13:42:51","slug":"crta-in-the-crosshairs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sharefoundation.info\/en\/crta-in-the-crosshairs\/","title":{"rendered":"CRTA in the Crosshairs"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

A case study of media reporting on Serbian election observer CRTA<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Monitoring period: 1 September\u20134 October 2026<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This case study is part of the ongoing media monitoring that the SHARE Foundation is carrying out during the 2026 election campaign in Serbia, covering 25 national online media outlets and the most popular social media. Between 1 September and 4 October 2026, the monitoring recorded a sharp rise in negative coverage and a smear campaign targeting the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability \u2013 CRTA \u2013 an organisation that has built a reputation over the past decade as a credible independent election observer in Serbia. During the period analysed, a total of 130 articles mentioned CRTA in a markedly negative context, mostly in tabloid media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most of the coverage in the corpus focuses on disputing the organisation\u2019s identity, while none of the claims made in the published articles offers a reasoned challenge to CRTA\u2019s methodology. In the middle of an election cycle, most media outlets are systematically challenging the legitimacy of the civil society organisation with the greatest authority in election observation in Serbia. Media close to the ruling structures play a central role in this process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of the 25 outlets monitored, 12 have published articles in which CRTA is the target of a smear campaign. Some of them generate content challenging CRTA\u2019s legitimacy, while others pick it up, keep it on the agenda and further intensify the established narrative. The absence of arguments and facts to support the claims made in these articles suggests that their purpose is to undermine public trust in an organisation that consistently sheds light on irregularities in the electoral process and the misuse of public resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although continuous, the attacks on CRTA are growing in intensity as the election approaches. While there were days at the start of the monitoring period with no articles referring to CRTA in a negative tone, such articles were published almost daily during the final eight days, from 27 September to 4 October.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The highest number of articles was published on 27 September, the day after CRTA declined Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s invitation to take part in a debate on RTS, followed by Sunday 4 October, when an audio recording was released in which a lawyer from CRTA\u2019s legal team, Vladimir Tupanjac, can allegedly be heard advising people that, \u2018if they really have to\u2019 attack the police, they should do it smartly and \u2018put their hoods up\u2019. The media attacks on CRTA come from four main sources: the top of the executive, party operatives, pseudo-independent bodies and anonymous social media accounts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The attacking narrative can be grouped into six types of discrediting claims: that CRTA is a political party in disguise; that a member of CRTA\u2019s legal team joined the Republic Electoral Commission (RIK) in its expanded election-period composition, on behalf of the Student List; that CRTA is funded from abroad; that CRTA\u2019s research is rigged; that it is preparing to contest the election; and that it is implicated in violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The techniques the media used to discredit CRTA include, among others, status reclassification \u2013 insisting that the organisation is not an independent election observer but an electoral participant \u2013 and false attribution of affiliation, linking speakers at a student press conference to CRTA even though they are not its members. Others were using details from CRTA members\u2019 biographies to damage the organisation\u2019s credibility; \u2018chain\u2019 association with other organisations or individuals without evidence of any such link; and pre-emptive delegitimisation, pre-emptively presenting findings that CRTA might publish on election day under the guise of breaking news.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The target of the attacks was most often the organisation as a whole, but also named individuals within it, such as Vukosava Crnjanski, Ra\u0161a Nedeljkov and Pavle Dimitrijevi\u0107, as well as the lawyer Vladimir Tupanjac.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the monitoring period, the attacks on CRTA passed through three stages: challenging its impartiality, reclassifying its status and financial delegitimisation. The next three phases are currently under way: personalisation, pre-emptive challenging of findings and criminalisation. The final three phases that may follow are institutional action, attacks on election-night findings and a legislative outcome \u2013 in effect, making the organisation\u2019s work impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building a negative image of CRTA<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Most of the negative articles about CRTA (101 of 130) were published on six portals in the corpus: Kurir, Informer, Novosti, B92, Alo and Politika.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurir and Informer published the most articles, 19 each. While Informer is where news targeting CRTA is produced \u2013 and its articles are the longest of all the outlets analysed \u2013 Kurir is where the attacks are picked up and amplified. Novosti also republished a large number of articles (18), but this portal also produces news attacking CRTA and is the first to publish it. B92 likewise republishes articles from other outlets (17), but its coverage is notably free of a sensationalist tone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ten or more articles were also recorded on Alo (15), which produces news attacking CRTA and publishes it first, and on Politika (13) and Pink (10), which republish rather than create news about CRTA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n