ELECTIONS 26: A campaign without debate

The ruling bloc pushed a series of coordinated messages through all major media outlets, at times using identical wording across several outlets on the same day. The opposition had only a handful of messages, mostly reactive.

The second week of election campaign monitoring covers September 14-20. We collected 28,371 articles from 25 monitored online media outlets. On social media, we analyzed 120,190 posts from the feeds of ten simulated personas on TikTok, Instagram, and X.

The week was marked by an imbalance in both the volume and coordination of messages. Some opposition messages could not be read in their original form at all, appearing only as quotations in media outlets close to the government.

The week at a glance

In online media, the main topic was the first-instance judgments against former KLA leaders before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague, with coverage peaking around September 16. At the same time, attacks on the student movement and the opposition intensified compared with the previous week. Ilija Srdanović, the lead candidate on the Student List, was the individual targeted most often.

The picture on social media was different. Kosovo was virtually absent from the feeds of pro-government accounts, while attacks on students were almost the only political content. In the same week, nsinfo.rs and Aleksandar Vučić’s official account dropped out of the group of most prominent accounts in this cluster; Sputnik Serbia and an Instagram profile labeled by the platform as AI-generated entered it.

In the area of rights and freedoms, two Instagram accounts were suspended, at least temporarily: those of the satirical outlet Triugao and Ilija Srdanović.

Words That Defined the Week

The week’s vocabulary points to a campaign centered on one name and one date. The most frequent words were European, president, Serbian, Vučić, and election. Foreign-policy lingo followed closely behind: Russian, Russia, Ukraine, American, attack, and war. These appeared more often than any domestic election-related term other than election itself.

The word student ranked 43rd, behind Red Star, Partizan, match, and sport. This finding echoes SHARE’s analysis of the 2023 campaign, when entertainment, sports, and crime news pushed the election to the informational margins.

Media overview

KLA Judgments as the Main Topic

Reporting on war crimes and the judgments against former KLA leaders peaked on September 16. That day, Ivica Dačić repeated the same assessment in three outlets: that the judgments confirmed the KLA had been a criminal organization, N1 reported. Coverage of Kosovo relied on isolated examples, from Kurir’s reporting on testimony about crimes to Informer’s claim that Serbian children in Kosovo had been barred from attending a magic show while convicted KLA members were being celebrated.

Intensified Attacks on the Student Movement

The main change from the previous week was a sharper campaign against the student movement. The attacks followed two lines. The first presented the movement as a foreign project, through claims of funding from Croatia and questions about candidates’ origins, as in B92’s article claiming that Croats hoped for chaos on Serbia’s streets, or Informer’s article on the candidates’ “dark files.” The second portrayed protests as a source of disorder, with headlines such as Novosti’s claim that “blockaders” were calling on people to hide older citizens’ identity cards so they could not vote.

The Student List’s filing of the signatures required to register for the election drew a particular wave of attacks. Alo described it as a circus, and other tabloids adopted a similar tone.

Identical Phrasing Across Several Outlets on the Same Day

Ana Brnabić’s description of the protests as a psychological operation appeared in nearly identical form on Informer’s and Pink’s websites on September 16. Dačić’s assessment of the KLA was repeated in three media outlets that same day.

Messages From the Ruling Bloc

• Financial assistance for citizens. The acting finance minister announced and carried out one-time payments to pensioners and socially vulnerable people, while the number of applications was reported daily. Prva, Pink, and Kurir covered the story.
• The caretaker government is functioning normally. Ministers are signing contracts, visiting sites, and announcing continued work on projects, from energy upgrades for public buildings to the first phase of the Belgrade metro.
• Infrastructure as proof of results. Coverage included the opening of a drone assembly plant and the announcement of an opening date for the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed rail line.
• A president close to the people. Vučić said that he was taking part in the campaign as an ordinary person and that he feels most at home in smaller communities, Pink reported.
• An independent foreign policy. This included affirmations of commitment to friendship with Russia, reported by Politika, and an announcement of joint police patrols with China, reported by Tanjug.
• President to Resign on September 27. B92 and Vreme presented the announcement as an orderly end to the term and a continuation of the current government.

Messages From the Opposition

• Refusal to engage in tabloid attacks or a televised duel. Srdanović declined to respond in kind to the targeting against him, Nova and N1 reported. His repeated refusal to accept an invitation to a TV debate also drew attention, Blic reported.
• Responsibility regarding the electoral threshold. Representatives of the Student List called on all parties to act responsibly with regard to the threshold, N1 reported.

Other Messages

• Warning Against Using the Prosecution as a Political Tool. Sanja Radivojević warned that the Higher Public Prosecutor’s analysis of the events in Belgrade on March 15 last year (the “sound cannon” affair) was expected to criminalize the student movement and discredit the nongovernmental sector, Danas and N1 reported. This narrative was countered in the media by expert opinions and reminders of international confirmation of cases that the authorities are now covering up through misuse of the prosecution.

What appeared in the feed

A Disconnect Between Portals and Social Media

Although Kosovo was the week’s most prominent topic on online news outlets, it did not appear in the feeds of pro-government accounts used in this monitoring to track the campaign on social media. The targets in that cluster were the Student List, the opposition, the student movement, and Srdanović. The KLA, Kosovo, Kurti, and Thaçi were not among them. On news portals, the attack on students was embedded in a broader agenda; on social media, it was almost the only political content.

Content promoted by the algorithm to a pro-government account sought to discredit the movement in advance, claiming that excuses for an election defeat were being prepared before the election (@tamy99696, TikTok, September 17).

Who Was Speaking

In the pro-government cluster, nsinfo.rs and Aleksandar Vučić’s official account, @buducnostsrbijeav, dropped out of the group of most prominent accounts. Sputnik Serbia and the Instagram account @klipperdanijelsrbi1 entered it.

In its description, that account carries Instagram’s “AI-generated profile” label, meaning the platform identifies it as artificially generated. It posts edits featuring Aleksandar Vučić and messages against the student movement, including a fake ballot on which item number three, the Student List’s number, is crossed out. The account has 2,793 posts, 1,430 followers, and follows 3,570 accounts. A profile with a small audience of its own but a high volume of posting became one of the most prominent voices in pro-government feeds, while the account of the governing list’s lead candidate dropped out of that group. In this case, visibility comes not from the audience but from the algorithm.

Visual Content

The same image traveled through different clusters this week, but not equally far.

The most frequently repeated image was a photograph of the Student List itself, showing candidates making the number three sign. It was appropriated and turned into a subject of mockery (@mojasrpska92, X, September 16). Half of all instances in which the image appeared in the monitored feeds were concentrated in that cluster.

A photograph of the Student List, repurposed by pro-government accounts with mocking comments.

The most frequently repeated image was a photograph of the Student List itself, showing candidates making the number three sign. It was appropriated and turned into a subject of mockery (@mojasrpska92, X, September 16). Half of all instances in which the image appeared in the monitored feeds were concentrated in that cluster.

A photograph of the Student List, repurposed by pro-government accounts with mocking comments.

Pro-Student Cluster

The most frequently repeated visual content was a call to sign the student plan, announcing gatherings by location (@studentilazarevca, Instagram, September 18). Almost all observed instances of this content appeared within that cluster.

A call to sign the student plan, content that barely spread beyond its own cluster.

Undecided Cluster

The most frequently repeated item was a call to sign the European Serbia list (@SSP_Cukarica, X, September 16), which spread moderately to pro-opposition accounts.

The pattern is clear. Mobilizing content remains enclosed within its own network. Discrediting content travels beyond it.

Rights and freedoms in the digital environment

Two Instagram accounts, both connected with criticism of the authorities, were taken down during the week.

The account of the satirical outlet Triugao was suspended on the evening of September 16. It is a curated bulletin of citizens’ comments with a strongly anti-government tone, rather than an editorially produced news outlet. The outlet itself announced the suspension through its X account. The account was not restored. Instead, a new profile was opened and is rebuilding its audience from scratch.

Ilija Srdanović’s Instagram account was suspended on the evening of September 20, a few hours after he responded on the platform to Vučić’s invitation to a televised duel. N1, Danas, and 021 reported on the suspension. His access was restored later that night, according to 021.

The different outcomes reflect the affected accounts’ differing visibility. The lead candidate on an electoral list had his account restored within hours. The satirical outlet did not; it had to start over.

About the 2026 Election Monitoring

The 2026 election monitoring tracks online media coverage, the course of the campaign on social media, and violations of digital rights and freedoms. Findings are published in weekly reviews throughout the election campaign.

We monitor content from 25 online media outlets in Serbia and the feeds of ten simulated personas on TikTok, Instagram, and X. Persona clusters are based on content each persona actually received that week, rather than on an assigned political position, so a persona’s cluster may change from week to week.